In The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference, the African American writer, Richard Wright applauded the 'stormy' and 'turbulent' 'currents' of 'the despised, the insulted, the hurt and the dispossessed' who met in Bandung. He praised the emerging 'class and racial consciousness' that positioned the West in a periphery of the world (Wright, 1956, p. 12), and described how the solidarities of 'the underdogs of the human race' opened to a new world order which could be described as 'radical cosmopolitanism' . The radical or revolutionary cosmopolitanism and its rapport/relation to Africa -our field of study -is at the center of this special issue. But cosmopolitanism is also a never-ending debate that first we need to address.
concept of cosmopolitanism was at the center of both. Two tendencies emerged. On the one hand, some discussed 'legal cosmopolitanism' which carried the idea -and somehow the need for -global power structures labeled 'world state' , 'world government' , or 'institutional cosmopolitanism' following Kok-Chor Tan's words (Tan, 2010) . Such definitions were, as Thomas Pogge explains, committed to a concrete political idea of a global order in which 'all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties' and supposedly become 'fellow citizens of a universal republic' (Pogge, 1992, p. 49) . Legal cosmopolitanism thus deals with supranational policy-making and the positioning of international law and institutions like the United Nations as the guarantors of individual rights that push for a similar legal status worldwide (Erman, 2016) .
On the other hand, authors explored moral cosmopolitanism, on which legal cosmopolitanism relied. Moral cosmopolitanism appeared as a universal ethic of power that emphasized that the human being was the primary and ultimate 'unit of concern' (Pogge, 1992, p. 48) . Moral cosmopolitanism placed individual freedom at the center of any political system. It also insisted on the moral obligation to support each other on the grounds of a shared humanity (Brown & Held, 2010, pp. 1-2) . International institutions could contribute to secure this humanistic endeavor, but as Tan explains (2010, p. 182) , for authors like David Held and its 'cosmopolitan democracy' model, 1 it is not a pre-requisite. Indeed, moral cosmopolitanism is not 'world-statism' and does not wish to replace modern state with international institutions. Rather, it parts from a radical methodological individualism and carries a sense of 'sameness' out of the diversity of experience, histories, cultures, and identities. Unity emerges out of similar political practices which allow each person, anywhere to exercise his/her rights freely. And, in this sense cosmopolitanism as described above seems to be natural and ineluctable: in a world shaped by mobilities, connections, and métissages, one could only be cosmopolite.
However, such a definition of cosmopolitanism -unlike what its defenders may say -does not have anything natural. On the contrary, it is the result of specific historical, political, and intellectual circumstances that need to be explained and problematized. More generally, both the legal and the moral definitions of cosmopolitanism reveal two limitations. One is, as Thomas Fouquet notes in the final article of this issue: the individuals who are supposed to exercise these rights in connection to other people worldwide are usually social and political elites. Such theories link cosmopolitanism to some globalized culture, developed in Western metropoles and shared by social and political elites, who have the financial, social, and cultural resources to be 'in the world' thanks to travels, education, nationality, or social networks (Calhoun, 2002, p. 871) and who therefore use cosmopolitanism as a cultural marker to claim some global citizenship (Nussbaum, 2010) . This 'class consciousness of frequent travelers' (Calhoun, 2002) , is usually opposed to 'ordinary' people who, to several authors, do not seem to have produced forms of solidarities which could be labeled cosmopolitanism, just because they are not elite and thus (supposedly) unaware of their non-vindicated cosmopolitan habits (Chakrabarty, 2010; Kang, 2013) . Secondly, cosmopolitanism is regularly turned into a discourse which, instead of analyzing global ways of exercising political or economic power with some critical distance, seeks means to legitimate them.
Furthermore, as Paul Gilroy noted (2004) , the way the thinkers of moral and legal cosmopolitanism use this concept perpetuates some dominant Eurocentric perspective. Indeed, despite their global dimensions both in terms of intellectual perspective and outreach, these first studies on legal and moral cosmopolitanism are firmly rooted in a historical and intellectual context shaped in and by the West. When one looks at the genealogy of the concept that the most famous theorists of cosmopolitanism (Beck, Inglis, Fine among others) mobilize, he/she can notice that they regularly refer to imperial projects, linked to the West's domination over the rest of the world: first, the Stoicists -on whom the imperial project of Alexander III of Macedon was founded -, then the Enlightenment, and finally and they systematically mention Immanuel Kant who initiated the idea of international law in his 1796 essay 'Towards Perpetual Peace' , but also morally justified colonial expansion as a natural stretch of Western universalism.
In sum, these first studies on cosmopolitanism do not challenge past Eurocentric representations, nor do they observe the essentialist and polarized dimension of a concept they, again, geographically and historically anchor in Europe. A fortiori, they are linked to a political project (liberal universalism of human rights conceived as a foreseeable future and an ideal world order). This political project is supposed to fully materialize itself in a new period of human history: the globalization era. Having begun in the 1970s, globalization is without a doubt Western: even though the earth is now entirely interconnected, it is the West, its civilization and values, that still serve as its Ombilic. Now we also have to point out that a second series of studies emerged almost simultaneously, but seeking different goals. Less visible, at least initially, it is sometimes labeled 'new cosmopolitanism' (see Fine, 2007; Nielson, 1999) . From the early 1990s to the mid-2010s, authors trained in area studies as well as in Cultural and Postcolonial Studies reworked the notion of cosmopolitanism. New concepts appeared: from 'comparative cosmopolitanism' (Robbins, 1992) to 'lived cosmopolitanism' (Inglis, 2014, p. 69) , 'postcolonial cosmopolitanism' or 'patriot cosmopolitanism' (Appiah, 1997) , 'rooted cosmopolitanism' (Cohen, 1992) or 'vernacular cosmopolitanism' (Bhabha, 1996) , 'subaltern cosmopolitanism' (Sousa Santos, 2005) or 'discrepant cosmopolitanism' (Clifford, 1992) . Most criticized 'orthodox' definitions of cosmopolitanism which continued to propose a Eurocentric narrative both of the concept itself and of world history. This narrative focused on the political and forgot about its cultural and historical aspects (Gilroy, 2010) . They referred to a 'cosmopolitan condition' (Fine, 2007, p. 39 ) which emphasized 'multi-layered' forms of solidarity globalization generated, explored contemporary migrations, discussed translocal subject positions or transnational race and gender communities and how the world became a place for contestation. They also proposed alternative genealogies and insisted on locating the researchers' point of view. A large amount of literature then came from Asia, Latin America and also Africa. Most insisted on the need to decenter the gaze from Europe to truly build a cosmopolitan perspective. Though critical of this notion that usually develops along the idea of a European-based modernity, they proposed to discuss -and somehow capture -a 'cosmopolitan universalism' (Amrith, 2005, p. 558) and define it in their own terms. Cosmopolitanism then became an even more crowded, but also a more appealing, space.
From one to many: cosmopolitan multiplicities
In this issue, we do not intend to add more to the theorization of cosmopolitanism. We rather propose to dissociate cosmopolitanism from past ideological preconceptions that restrict its analytic value. We go along researchers in social sciences who investigated the term and noted that its usefulness and significance are more important (Hanley, 2008; Grenet & Smyrnelis, 2016; Inglis, 2014) when one relies on a plural definition of cosmopolitanism-s. The historian in Middle East studies, Will Hanley, clearly sums up the interest of such a definition:
Much of the best work on cosmopolitanism argues that there are multiple cosmopolitanisms. To privilege its bourgeois Western secular version is to deny those who, like the illiterate laborer who knows the exchange rates between the four kinds of currency he holds in his pockets, should also be given credit for cosmopolitan sophistication. (Hanley, 2008 (Hanley, , p. 1360 The same goes for the historian Mathieu Grenet who confirms the scientific relevance of plurality we also adhere to:
The use of the plural form allows me to insist on the key contribution of the social science discourse in a fieldwork long dominated by a philosophical and universalist discourse inspired by the Kantian tradition. But, the recent works from historians, sociologists and political scientists about cosmopolitanism highlight the visible disjunction between cosmopolitanism as an abstract notion and as universalist ideal; and cosmopolitanisms as a set of diverse practices or even as the convergences of heterogeneous ideals. (Grenet & Smyrnelis, 2016) In focusing on the plurality of cosmopolitanism, our aim is to evaluate the political, historical and anthropological uses of the notion (from 'cosmopolitanism' , to 'cosmopolitism' or 'cosmopolitics') (Cheah & Robbins, 1998) . We think it would allow us to reevaluate our approach on our fieldwork: 1950s to 1970s Africa. We do not propose to reexamine conceptual propositions that invent African forms of cosmopolitanism as Achille Mbembé (2005) and Taiye Selasi (2005) offered with Afropolitanism. Rather we want to examine the operability of the concept from a historically and geographically situated perspective (Haraway, 1988, p. 579) , which anchors the notion in a territory (Africa), a moment (the 1950s and 1970s) and a topic (circulations of revolutionary ideas, practices and agency). Such connections between a fieldwork, a continent, and an object may, at first, seem incompatible but they actually open to some engaged critical thinking about Africa's role and positionality in world history, starting with addressing the relation between Africa and cosmopolitanism.
It may sound contradictory to discuss cosmopolitanism in a place where the concept was introduced alongside coloniality and the celebration of Western modernity. The point here is not to propose an analytical overturn which would defend some African modernity that would encapsulate cosmopolitanism, however interesting that would be. As Thomas Fouquet states in his critical essay on cosmopolitanism from Africa, we wish to see how this concept enables us to interrogate past and present representations of the continent. Africa was (and somehow still is) traditionally considered as a static and sedentary space, marked by 'tradition, closure and particularisms' . In other words, it is usually depicted as a monolithic space; as the antithesis of the 'cultural openness' cosmopolitanism is supposed to carry. It symbolizes the 'absence' (Mbembé, 2013) of transnational connections, or the fusion of various frames of reference cosmopolitanism is to represent. This trope of Africa as a 'non-place' of cosmopolitanism, is reversed in the papers presented in this issue. The contributors territorialize cosmopolitanism without reifying its original meaning, by inserting it as a tool to explore the multiplicity of political, cultural, social, and intellectual mobilizations it generated. Africa appears as a testing zone, a space of political, social, and cultural confrontation and 'linking' (Mignolo, 2007) , but most of all as a space of confluence shaped out of cultural mobilities, encounters, and inventions. This issue's focal point is not Africa per se but the processes and the circulations that crossed this space at a specific moment in the history of the continent: the decolonization and the foundation of independent states. Eugenia Palieraki and Pierre Asselin for instance show that Latin American and Vietnamese revolutionaries saw Algiers, not only as the 'Mecca of Revolution' , but as a merging point, a privileged place where they could, like nowhere else, invent a geography of protest at a local, national, and transnational levels. In this issue, we therefore propose to observe how Africa became a 'laboratory' for cosmopolitanism. In this, we join Felwine Sarr, the author of Afrotopia (Sarr, 2016) who, as he talked about the monograph he coedited, Ecrire l'Afrique -Monde [Writing World-Africa], stated that:
Africa is the only space which can offer a large scale laboratory to experiment new necessary forms. In this space, migration flows, structural data (geophysics) and intellectual ones (the migration of ideas) intertwine to lead the way to another space. (Mbembe, Sarr, & Convafreux, 2017) In addition to defending the rather surprising duo Africa/cosmopolitanism, the scientific project of this issue may also seem unusual because of the timeline selected. If cosmopolitanism became a reality by the end of the Cold War, thanks to economic and political globalization, and if, it long was a utopia (from the ancient Greeks to the 1980s, going through Kant), how can we talk about cosmopolitanism referring to the 1950s-1970s? The answer is simple: we take globalization through the growing interconnections (for political, economic, social, and cultural reasons) of territories geographically, historically and culturally distant. There are many globalizations… and the globalization we are interested in is predominantly political: 'cosmopolitics' molded after the Second World War, in the footsteps of the Bandung Conference or what Dipesh Chakrabarty names 'anticolonial cosmopolitanism' (Chakrabarty, 2010, p. 59) .
This chronology also reveals our view on postcolonial African history. More than 50 years after African independences, our goal is not to revisit the 1950s-1970s as transitional decades that turned Africa away from colonial empires to the creation of independent states, for some, shaped under the authority of 'fathers of the nations' like Leopold Sedar Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, or Jomo Kenyatta. In spanning from the 1950s to the 1970s, we want to avoid a heavy focus on the independences, identified as a break which regularly drives binary perspectives and again oppose on the one hand, colonial Africa as a 'locked-in' territory bearing supposedly exclusive relationships with the metropole and; on the other hand, post-independence Africa crossed by transnational connections in a new world order in the making. Instead, we want to explore 'the Sixties' in their longue durée 2 , to better understand the dynamics, tensions and links activists, political leaders or researchers from Africa, the Americas, Europe, or Asia constituted. How did they frame this moment in world history and allowing the continent to reposition itself in the Cold War geopolitical scheme? Steffi Marung clearly illustrates this point. In her essay on the emergence of Russian Africanism, she explains that Africa was included in a 'narrative of socialism' as early as the 1920s and 1930s, drawing lines between Lenin's theorization of imperialism and the colonial domination in Africa.
Then, we do not want to focus on the 1960s as a 'turn' . Any focus only on the 1960s would level off the chronology as a quite traditional linear account, fitting any land and any people. Rather, we focus on the political, intellectual, and cultural 'routes' and connections (Clifford, 1997) , historical actors like the students of the FEANF, Malcolm X, or the Black Panthers, the Vietnamese nationalists used to inscribe themselves in a world protest. In that respect, Errol Henderson's renewed analysis of Malcolm X's 1964 tour of Africa and Sarah Fila-Bakabadio's original work on the Black Panthers' 1971 trip to Socialist Congo-Brazzaville, exemplify that move. Malcolm X and the Panthers tried to redefine the meaning of the anti-segregationist struggle which began in 1954 with the first bus boycott in Baton Rouge (Alabama). Both Henderson and Fila-Bakabadio show how Malcolm X and the Panthers described the Black Power Movement not as an American struggle but as an anticolonial -and later -anti-imperialist one based on class and race. Like nineteenth century black nationalists, they tried to turn an American problem into a world one, relying on their historical links to Africa and a common rhetoric of the racially oppressed.
We therefore do not consider that only the 1960s led the way to some 'distinctive and novel kind of radical global consciousness' (Dubinksy, Krull, Lord, Mills, & Rutherford, 2009, p. 3) but that such a consciousness was elaborated in the 1950s (with earlier germs in the 1930s and 1940s) and was prolonged in the 1970s, when the African states were consolidating. But we think that the 1950s-1970s were specific because of the emergence of a global political sphere that united people throughout the world around questions of nationality, class, race, imperialism, capitalism, and colonialism (see Dubinksy et al., 2009, p. 2) , providing a global frame for local collective action.
Our last point may also surprise: it links cosmopolitanism and revolution. If cosmopolitanism is mainly a liberal concept made to promote some global ethic(s) based on the defense of individual and human rights, how can we associate it with the idea of revolution which carries a sense of collective agency? To identify cosmopolitanism to the political liberalization of human rights is a social project we all share. However, as Craig Calhoun notes (2002) , since the 1990s, it has regularly been used not to promote human rights but to justify the absence of social justice arguing that the social component of justice is incompatible with liberal individualism. Cosmopolitanism then implicitly contains and reproduces the elitist prospect Craig Calhoun decries and Will Hanley criticizes as an untold nostalgia for the colonial times (Hanley, 2008) .
We thus join these researchers when they invite to break from the liberal and elitist pitfalls visible in the first series of studies on cosmopolitanism and as they encourage us to explore other forms of cosmopolitanism like 'vulgar' (a term from Hanley, 2017, pp. 27-52 ; see also Gilroy, 2006, p. 67) , 'grassroots cosmopolitanism' (see Fouquet in this issue) or 'revolutionary cosmopolitanism' . Indeed, the historical actors mentioned in this issue are not from Western elites: they are African students who lived in-between Europe and Africa, Black Power activists who dreamt of Africa and finally traveled there, Latin American exiles, minority political spokesmen like Malcolm X, Soviet scientists or Vietnamese revolutionaries infatuated with the Algerian national struggle. In brief, our goal is, to use Thomas Fouquet's words, 'to focus on some of [cosmopolitanism's] tangible marks and 'seizable portions' […] [and to] engag[e] with cosmopolitanism as a field of social, political and cultural concrete experience in Africa' . This issue therefore proposes to explore forms of historically, sociologically and culturally 'rooted cosmopolitanism' (Appiah, 2006) or 'cosmopolitanisms' 3 that emerge from 'on the ground' practices and initiate transnational solidarity networks.
Such networks led the way to what we call 'revolutionary cosmopolitanism' . This notion has backboned our discussions since the origins of this project. It both means observing how protest groups articulated ideals and features of revolutionary rhetorics, from socialist to anti-colonial discourses (the liberalization of human rights, the emergence of an egalitarian, unitarian, and classless society). All defended these principles not only as steps towards a political, economic, and cultural emancipation from a common Western domination but also as a global societal project that could apply anywhere. However, we do not, as James Ingram proposes (2013, p. 38) , define revolutionary cosmopolitanism as a reiteration of the universalism carried out by past revolutions like the 1789 French one, but we see it in terms of solidarity networks of struggling people who celebrate both their commonalities and diversity as the 1969 Pan-African Festival in Algiers exemplified.
Cosmopolitanism, internationalism or nationalism? The moral and spatial framework of revolutionary cosmopolitanism
By dissociating cosmopolitanism from its usual acceptation both liberal and elitist, we are now faced with diverse forms of cosmopolitanism still global but based on some ethics of solidarity. As Andrea Sangiovanni notes, demands for social justice are usually paired with demands for solidarity that allow the emergence of 'joint action' built around a 'shared experience' , a 'shared identity' , or a 'shared action and/or agency' which usually parallels 'moral cosmopolitanism ' (2015, p. 340) . Solidarity introduces some liability between people who emphasize a similar political, social, racial or class 'condition' to generate a bond based on mutual recognition or reciprocity, identical goals and sometimes a common action plan. Ethics of solidarity contests the centrality of the individual and focuses on the 'relation' (Glissant, 1997) between people.
The papers gathered in this issue explore how revolutionary groups and networks shaped 'relations' to some 'othered other[s]' (Mbembé, 2013, p. 47) 4 and overthrew 'moral cosmopolitanism' . Then, cosmopolitanism still is supranational, but no is longer related to individual rights, it refers to forms of solidarity between struggling people. In his article on Vietnamese revolutionaries' connections with Africa, and particularly with the Algerian FLN, Pierre Asselin states that, even in the midst of the war against the US-Diem alliance, the Vietnamese FLN actively supported national liberation movements in Africa and was always prompt to recognize newly independent countries. This support ' sometimes took concrete forms, including, reportedly, training insurgents to fight in the ongoing Algerian war of independence' . Eugenia Palieraki observes a similar type of concrete and material solidarity from the FLN to the Chilean exiles in Algeria. These cases confirm what Tom Bailey noted in the introduction of the special issue of Critical Horizons he edited on 'contestatory cosmopolitanism':
In place of an abstract sense of global community, then, contestatory cosmopolitanism promises contingent, grounded and dynamic responses to global political challenges. (Bailey, 2016, p. 2) Precisely, these 'grounded' (and therefore, local) 'responses' are often inscribed in an expanded, and even global, geographic dynamic. Eugénia Palieraki for instance notes that the solidarity expressed by the Algerian government towards the Chilean exiles created some political and moral duties for Chilean activists who, in turn, had to support other national liberation movements, like the Saharawi and the Palestinians. This logic of chain solidarities dramatically contributed to 'cosmopolitanizing' the militant subjectivities of Chilean exiles in Algeria. As Pierre Asselin also reminds us, a similar logic was at play among the Vietnamese:
In Vietnamese communist thinking [...] the prospects for the future of Vietnam and of its revolution became linked to the prospects of the rest of the non-capitalist world and the Third World in particular, to worldwide revolutionary currents, and vice versa.
In her article on the revolutionary cosmopolitanism of the FEANF students, Françoise Blum confirms that African revolutionary movements proposed to renew the meaning of cosmopolitanism from an African perspective. She unveils their political trajectories and reveals how, along with a common French education at the Ecole Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer (National School of Overseas Territories), their connections to other colonized people from Guinea, Togo, Senegal, Chad, or Congo helped them to develop what Blum calls 'a plural understanding of the world' . Blum offers a number of ideas and analytical guidelines on revolutionary cosmopolitanism in Africa. She recalls how problematic the liberal definition of cosmopolitanism is in the African context and, at large, in (post)colonial contexts. She rightly states that liberalism and human rights were ideals the African anticolonial activists identified to a metropolitan discourse that justified colonization. They critically addressed French egalitarianism they were never included in, and rather insisted on the idea of justice.
Referring to solidarity as a core notion that supports cosmopolitanism brings it closer to internationalism. In this dossier, internationalism is not taken as the link between organizations that need transnational networks to promote their nationally anchored goals and missions. This is what Timothy Brennan does when he defines again cosmopolitanism in elitist class terms and internationalism as an ideology of 'the domestically restricted, the recently relocated' and 'the provisionally exiled and temporarily weak' (Brennan, 2003, p. 42) . We refuse this sharp distinction that, as David Featherstone shows, reproduces the elitist bias of the first series of works on cosmopolitanism (Featherstone, 2012, p. 49) . Indeed, to oppose cosmopolitanism and internationalism implies that the openness to the world is a practice for and by the elites only. It synchronically constraints revolutionary movements and activists in nation-states, while the contributors in this issue demonstrate that their struggles spread beyond borders. Finally, the revolutionary movements and their uses of cosmopolitanism show that it can be a 'site of contestation' as much as internationalism (Featherstone, 2012, p. 53) .
That being said, one could still argue that the political and social organizations we study, despite an occasional insertion in a transnational context, carry national identities. Then, shouldn't we talk about 'long distance nationalisms' as Benedict Anderson does (1998, p. 17) , rather than about cosmopolitanism? Our counter-argument is twofold. First, the groups and people we refer to did not necessarily relate to the 'nation' or to some national loyalty nor did they consider like Anderson that the nation-state was identified with a specific territory, a homeland (Anderson, 2006, chapter 10 'Census, map, museum') . Françoise Blum for instance shows that the FEANF students referred simultaneously to group, class, cultural, regional, and linguistic adscriptions, while their fidelities were shaped in-between the celebration of pan-Africanism and their hope to found independent nation-states. Similarly, in his paper on Malcolm X, Errol Henderson clearly states that, by 1964, Malcolm X articulated black nationalism in global terms and insisted on the interdependence of the anticolonial struggle and the Black Power Movement. He did not only refer to some solidarity of the 'non-whites' oppressed by the West as the Black Panthers did when they visited Congo-Brazzaville, but he called for a co-construction of a 'broader struggle for freedom, justice and equality in the 'Third World' which carried the 'spirit of Bandung' worldwide' . It is precisely what Sunil Amrith (2005) described as the 'Bandung Spirit':
An almost physical feeling of solidarity and shared humiliation impelled this kind of internationalism [...] a sense of racial solidarity -called 'Afro-Asianism' , 'Third Worldism' , and often simply 'internationalism' -came to express the shared struggles of groups with different ethnic and national identities. (Amrith, 2005, p. 558) This leads us to our second counter-argument. We do not take the nation as an antonym to cosmopolitanism. To put it differently, and to use Robert Holton's words, the political, historical, and social 'rootedness' of revolutionary movements we study '[is] not necessarily an obstacle to love of and identification with the 'imagined community' of humanity' (Holton, 2002, p. 153) . Even though these movements are epistemologically localized, they illustrate the point made by the anthropologist Liisa Malkki (1992) who notes that, in a world increasingly shaped by salient mobility dynamics, the attachment to a nation and the identification to the homeland, are usually deterritorialized while the transnational dynamics also need to gain locality to be meaningful. In her essay, Sarah Fila-Bakabadio exposes the Black Panthers' forced connection to the Socialist Republic of Congo-Brazzaville. Their leader, Eldridge Cleaver, imagined that a shared Marxist ideology and a common condition of the racially oppressed would open to some mutual recognition that could empower him and the international section in the Black Power Movement. Fila-Bakabadio observes that such a dis-location in Africa did not mean that the Panthers looked for a decentered perspective on the Black Power but rather hoped it could help them to become prominent amidst cultural and revolutionary black nationalisms.
In sum, here we can observe both the deterritorialization of national ties -in the case of exiles or black nationalism in its reference to Africa -and the local grounding of the global (as in the case of Marxism tainted with religious faith as described by Blum or as a transnational connection between national liberation movements as Pierre Asselin notes). This perspective does not prevent us from exploring the pitfalls of such connections, as Errol Henderson does who, through Malcolm X's figure, explores the internal contradictions of revolutionary cosmopolitanism, the incompatibilities between national and geographically and culturally distant local contexts.
Yet, to consider that the nation and cosmopolitanism are not antithetical is not the only conclusion we draw in this issue. The seven papers gathered here establish that, in the time period and geographical, political, and ideological context we are interested in, revolutionaries, researchers, as much as students claim cosmopolitan and national ties which led the way to the emergence of a third referential frame, in-between globality and the nation: the Third World.
The Third World and revolutionary cosmopolitanism, 1950s-1970s
How is Africa connected to the spatial framework of the 1950s-1970s revolutionary cosmopolitanism? From Algiers to Paris and Saigon, revolutionary circulations opened to an anticolonial and anti-imperialist praxis in which Africa was a key laboratory. Revolutionaries did not only use their common experience of coloniality; they also invented this new space, the Third World, through 'mutual influence' (Goebel, 2017) and solidarity. The Vietnamese, for instance, supported the Algerians because they struggled against the same colonizer, the French. The Chileans, who had broken from Spain by the early nineteenth century, sought rapprochement with the Saharawi, who more than a century later, also broke with Spain without gaining independence. The Third World allowed revolutionaries to connect not only thanks to common theories of liberation (Marxism, anti-capitalism, the New Left) but also by considering this new space as an emancipated and emancipatory space where their encounter could generate new forms of protest. In this perspective, Africa was not a testing zone for the connectivity of foreign movements but a place where they could elaborate a political, intellectual Third World thought, away from its Eurocentric definitions (see Ganapathy-Doré, 2015) and unambiguously anticolonial.
This geographical scope prompted us to ask for contributions from specialists who work on Vietnam, Latin America, the United States, and the USSR. Also, it confirms a theoretical choice: we refuse to consider the political geography of the Cold War in terms of center (Western or Soviet) and periphery. We argue that the mid-twentieth century revolutionary cosmopolitanisms' spatial frame is global and it is forged through ties of variable geometry and relevance linking various spaces of contestation: Africa, as well as Latin America and Asia, though without excluding former colonial metropoles and the traditional centers of Cold War narratives (the United States and the USSR). For that matter, it was essential to mention the USSR, especially since we focus on revolutionary cosmopolitanism. Like the Western countries -which developed cosmopolitanism through liberalism since the late eighteenth century -the USSR undoubtedly produced its own revolutionary universalism by the twentieth century. In her paper about Soviet Africanists, Steffi Marung discusses the emergence of Soviet African Studies and shows how they were not meant to export models and norms to Africa but rather to raise awareness about Africa and the Third World in the USSR.
Finally, as mentioned throughout this introduction, the purpose of this dossier is to break from the sharp division of traditional post-War political geographies balanced between nations and transnational, globalized entities. Furthermore, it is to underline the key role of Africa in the cosmopolitanization of the 1950s-1970s revolutionary subjectivities and imaginaries. Thus, we take cosmopolitanism as a 'vivre ensemble' (Grenet & Smyrnelis, 2016) [living together] or as a form of 'convivance' (Vincent, 1994) in the same space -be it practical or an intention -from individuals, groups with diverse ethnic, national, religious, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. This 'convivance' does not mean one has to erasure his/her particular spatial and identity affiliations, nor does it entail the absence of conflicts (Vincent, 2009) but it refers to the transformation/cosmopolitanization/transnationalization of subjectivities. Consequently, studying cosmopolitanism means to inscribe the subjectivities in a social space, which is neither completely identified with the global scale nor with the local/ national, but that combines both and creates a new one (here the Third World).
Notes

Notes on contributors
